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EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE EXPORT
ADMINISTRATION AMENDMENTS OF 1977
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 22, 1977, President Carter signed the Export Administration
Amendments of 1977 (EAA), setting out new antiboycott rules affecting
trade with the Middle East.' The legislation was in response to the growing
furor over the impact of the Arab boycott in the United States.2 Backed
by the wealth of the oil-rich Arab states, the boycott has exerted increasing
pressure on American business to comply with their boycott regulations.'
The EAA was designed to reduce the boycott's effect on United States
commerce by forbidding compliance with certain boycott demands.
The broad scope of the new antiboycott statute should be of special
concern to the American multinational corporation, particularly those
with subsidiaries in the Arab League states' because United States subsidi-
aries are subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of the United States and
the host countries.5 The nature of the boycott and the general provisions
of the EAA are beyond the scope of this note and are fully discussed
elsewhere in this Symposium.6
This Note will discuss the application of the antiboycott regulations to
the United States subsidiary within the boycotting states. The boycott
issue illustrates the dilemma facing the United States subsidiary when the
national policies and laws of the domestic and host countries are in opposi-
tion, making conflicting demands on the subsidiary. The businessmen
would then run the risk of violating either the domestic or host country's
laws. After examining some of the difficulties the United States has en-
I Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as the EAA] amending the Export Administration Act of 1969, 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2401, et seq. (1970) (amended 1974).
2 N.Y. Times, June 23, 1977, § D, at 1, col. 2.
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20, 1976, at 73; TIME, Mar. 10, 1975, at 39; Arab Boycott, Hearings on
S.69 and S.92 Before the Subcomm. on International Finance of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977) (statement of'Senator
Harrison Williams) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
' The Arab League now comprises: Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan,
Algeria, Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Sudan, Tun-
isia, United Arab Emirates, and the two Republics of Yemen. Although following the primary
boycott, six states do not practice the secondary or tertiary boycotts, or engage in blacklisting.
These are Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia. Turck, The Arab
Boycott of Israel, 55 FOREIGN AFY. 472, 476 (1977).
1 Comment, Foreign Sovereign Compulsion and the Arab Boycott: A State Action Analogy,
65 GEO. L.J. 1001 (1977).
' See, e.g., Ludwig & Smith, The Business Effects of the Antiboycott Provisions of the
Export Administration Amendments of 1977-Morality Plus Pragmatism Equals
Complexity, 8 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 581 (1978). See also, Turck, note 4 supra.
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countered with the extraterritorial extension of its laws, this Note will
focus on the justification for the extraterritorial application of the antiboy-
cott legislation.
II. APPLICATION OF THE EAA TO THE UNITED STATES SUBSIDIARY
Title II of the EAA7 forbids compliance by United States companies with
certain foreign boycott-related requests. A United States person in the
interstate or foreign commerce of the United States is prohibited from
taking or knowingly agreeing to take actions with intent to comply with,
further, or support any boycott fostered or imposed by a foreign country
against a country which is friendly to the United States.' In order to be
considered a violation of the Act, the transaction must involve a (1)
"United States person," (2) take place in "United States commerce," and
(3) involve "taking or agreeing to take" certain prohibited actions in com-
pliance with a foreign boycott.9 When these three tests are met, the Con-
gress intends the antiboycott regulations to be applicable even to those
American businesses which reside in the boycotting countries.
The Congress has provided for exceptions allowing limited compliance
with that country's boycott laws with respect to activities exclusively
within that country, and with import requirements concerning goods "for
his own use, including the performance of contractual services within that
country."' 0 The Export Administration Regulations (EAR) set careful lim-
its on the scope of the exceptions in order to prevent them from becoming
an avenue for general avoidance."
The threshold issue concerns the residency status of the company in-
volved. In determining whether a firm is a "bona fide resident" and there-
fore included within the scope of the exceptions, all relevant factors are
considered: the physical presence in the country, whether the residence is
necessary for legitimate business reasons, the continuity of the residency,
the intent to maintain a long-term base of operations, size and nature of
its presence, whether the firm is registered to do business or incorporated
in the country, and whether the company has a similar presence in both
the boycotting and non-boycotting foreign countries in connection with
similar business activities.2 An example of the application of the EAA is
the situation in which a United States firm has been awarded a construc-
tion contract, the personnel who are sent to set up the operation are
I Although the EAA is nominally applicable to all foreign boycotts, it was formulated to
deal with the Arab boycott of Israel. See 13 WEEKLY COMP. or PRES. Doc. 898 (June 27, 1977).
EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(1).
Id.
EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(2)(F). Export Administration Regulations on Restrictive Trade
Practices or Boycotts [hereinafter cited as EAR], 43 Fed. Reg. 3508 (1978).
1 43 Fed. Reg. 3511 (1978).
'2 EAR § 369.3(f)(3), 43 Fed. Reg. 3531 (1978).
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deemed to be bona fide residents. However, where a company merely sends
its employees to the country seeking to establish an office or to visit a
prospective construction site in preparation of a contract bid, it fails to
meet the residency test because its employees do not yet have a permanent
business there."3 Some latitude is allowed in permitting the personnel to
furnish non-discriminatory boycott information required to establish its
residency, but they may only give such information as a United States
person who is already a bona fide resident in that country could furnish.'
Permanency is not necessary to meet the requirements of the EAA; a
general contracting company with an office on the site of the project in the
boycotting country is a bona fide resident even though the project may be
completed within six months.15 If a company has a permanent office in the
country that is necessary for legitimate business reasons, and the company
intends to continue business there in the future, it may satisfy the resi-
dency test despite the fact its office is not fully staffed year-round. For
example, if a computer company has a sales office in the country which is
necessary in servicing products sold to its clients the company is a resident,
even though the sales representative spends only two months out of the
year in that country. 6
Once a firm satisfies the residency requirement the statute permits con-
formance with the country's boycott laws covering his activities exclusively
within that country. The company may enter into contracts which require
adherence to the boycott laws in transactions involving the purchase or
sale of goods'7 or the use of local contractors within that country. 8 The
resident company may supply required information about its dealings with
the boycotted country as long as it compiles and furnishes the information
solely from its own knowledge. It may even give information about its
parent corporations dealings with the boycott target if it prepares it from
its own resources, without inquiry to the parent." It may not, however,
furnish information with respect to race, religion, sex, or national origin of
any United States person.2 1 Similarly, while the resident subsidiary may
agree not to hire a national of the boycotted country, it may not refuse
employment to a United States citizen on the basis of race, religion, sex,
or national origin regardless of whether or not the activity is exclusively
within the boycotting country.2 1 Since the statute applies only to transac-
, EAR § 369.3(f), Examples (iii), (v), 43 Fed. Reg. 3531 (1978).
* EAR § 369.3(f), Examples (iv), (vi), 43 Fed. Reg. 3531 (1978).
EAR § 369.3(f), Examples (xvi), 43 Fed. Reg. 3532 (1978).
" EAR § 369.3(f), Examples (xv), 43 Fed. Reg. 3532 (1978).
17 EAR § 369.3(f-1)(i)(i),(iv), 43 Fed. Reg. 3532 (1978).
EAR § 369.3(f-1)(1)(iii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3532 (1978).
EAR § 369.3(f-1), Examples (i), (iii), (iv), (v), 43 Fed. Reg. 3532 (1978).
EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(3).
21 EAR § 369.3(f-1)(ii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3532 (1978).
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tions in United States commerce and discrimination against United States
persons, the boycott-related discriminatory hiring practices of a United
States company regarding non-Americans either in the boycotting country
or, for instance, in Europe would not be a violation under the EAA, al-
though other civil rights laws might apply.
The subsidiary may obey the host country's boycott laws covering im-
ports of goods for its own use and in the performance of its contractual
obligations, as long as the goods are specifically identifiable as to their
source of origin.2" Goods are for the company's own use if they are to be
consumed by the company. For example, a company may import from
non-blacklisted firms specifically identifiable items such as candy or cos-
metics for its employees, or may order trademarked office machinery for
its own use.2
3
The exceptions, however, are not available for goods imported for resale
without further manufacture or refinement into another product, or incor-
poration into a functional part of a project constructed for another.2 ' Goods
imported for resale are not covered by the exception even if the firm is
acting in a procurement capacity or is in the retail business. The subsidiary
may comply when importing such items as lighting fixtures, plate glass,
or air-conditioning units when they are to be incorporated into the project.
Yet it may not comply in the same project regarding items not normally
incorporated into the project like office supplies, furniture, and typewrit-
ers. 25 The exceptions are allowable whether the project is on a "turnkey"
or a "cost-plus" basis with installment payments.2 1
Services are not included in the exceptions to the regulations, even if the
resident firm27 is importing the services for its own use. For example, in a
construction project, the resident subsidiary may not refuse to deal with
blacklisted architects and engineers because they render services even
though the drawings and plans might at some point be "imported" into
the boycotting country.2 8 The subsidiary may observe the host country's
laws even if it realized that they are boycott-based. Nevertheless, under
no circumstances may an American subsidiary "comply or agree to comply
with any host country law which would require him to discriminate against
... or to supply information about any United States person" on the basis
of race, religion, sex, or national origin.29
12 EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(2)(F).
EAR § 369.3(f-2), Example (ii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3534 (1978).
24 EAR § 369.3(f-2)(6)(iv),(v), 43 Fed. Reg. 3533 (1978).
25 EAR § 369.3(f-2), Example (vi), 43 Fed. Reg. 3534 (1978).
26 EAR § 369.3(f-2)(7), 43 Fed. Reg. 3533 (1978).
27 EAR § 369.3(f-2)(8), 43 Fed. Reg. 3533 (1978).
2- EAR § 369.3(f-2), Example (iv), 43 Fed. Reg. 3533-34 (1978).
' EAR § 369.3(f-2), 43 Fed. Reg. 3533 (1978).
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III. BASES OF JURISDICTION
The antiboycott regulations have renewed the controversy over the pro-
priety of the extraterritorial application of United States laws. The princi-
ple of territoriality provides that a state has absolute dominion and control
over all individuals and property within its its borders. A strong state-
ment of the classic territorial view is seen in Schooner Exchange v.
McFadden, where Chief Justice Marshall stated:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclu-
sive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself.
Any restriction upon it. . . from an external source, would imply a dimi-
nution of its sovereignty. . . .'
Each nation is deemed to have the power to prescribe rules of conduct
covering activities occurring within its borders. 2
The United States subsidiary is subject to the jurisdiction and regula-
tion of both the domestic and host countries. The United States asserts
jurisdiction over its American subsidiaries under four theories: (1) conduct
within its territory, (2) nationality, (3) control by American nationals, and
(4) effects within United States territory. Under the first theory, a state
may attack jurisdiction concerning activities of its subsidiary when there
is conduct within the United States that is part of or taken pursuant to
the prohibited action carried out abroad.3
Secondly, the United States may assert jurisdiction under the principle
of nationality. While the United States holds that a corporation is a citizen
of the state of its creation, 4 the subsidiary is considered an exception. The
subsidiary is held to be an American citizen if it is wholly owned and
operated by Americans, and therefore would be under the United States'
continuing personal jurisdiction. 5
Under the control theory, even though a subsidiary is considered a citi-
zen of the foreign country, if it is controlled by a United States company,
then the parent corporation can be held liable for the conduct of its subsid-
0 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 72-78 (1976).
3' 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136(1812). Justice Story in The Apollon stated the principle to
be that "the laws of no nation can justly extend beyond its own territories, except so far as
regards its own citizens. They can have no force to control the ... rights of any other nation,
within its own jurisdiction." 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370, 6 L. Ed. 111, 113 (U.S. 1824).
1 The traditional exceptions to the territorial rule, nationality, protective, universality,
and passive personality are discussed extensively in Research under the Auspices of the
Faculty of the Harvard Law School, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime,
29 AM. J. INT'L L. 443 (Supp. 1 1935).
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN REL. L. § 17 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
Id. at § 27.
I Comment, The Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 and Foreign Based Subsidiaries of
American Multinational Corporations: A Time to Abstain From Restraining, 11 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 206, 212 (1973); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
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iary's activities abroad which violate domestic law. 6 The Restatement
(Second) of American Foreign Relations Laws says that "[a] corporation
. . . has the nationality of the state which creates it," yet in comment (d)
it states "[w]hen the nationality of the corporation is different from the
nationality of the persons . . . who own or control it [then] the state of
the nationality of such persons has jurisdiction to prescribe and to enforce
in its territory rules of law governing their conduct."37
The fourth basis for jurisdiction over the subsidiary is the "effects doc-
trine,"3 which permits a state to assert its laws over conduct occurring
outside its territory which has an effect within its territory. This theory was
used in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America" to extend the Sher-
man Antitrust Act to cover restrictive trade agreements made abroad
which were intended to affect imports into the United States, and actually
did affect them."
Judge Learned Hand wrote:
We should not impute to Congress intent to punish all whom its courts
can catch, for conduct which has no consequences within the United
States. . . . On the other hand it is settled law . . . that any state may
impose liabilities . . . for conduct outside its borders that has conse-
quences within its borders."
The Alcoa case serves as principal support for Restatement section 18,
which requires: (1) a close connection between the prescribed conduct and
its effect, (2) that the effect must be "substantial," (3) that is must be
"direct and foreseeable" and (4) that its application must be "consistent"
with generally recognized principles of justice.4 2 This basis for jurisdiction
has been utilized to cover activities performed abroad by American compa-
nies, either alone or in conjunction with other foreign companies, when
their activities have a substantial impact on the United States. 3 It has
Vagts, The Global Corporation and International Law, 6 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 247, 251
(1971-1972); Petition of Heins, 33 F. Supp. 141 (E.DN.Y. 1940) (subsidiary held to be Ameri-
can even though it was domiciled in Panama); K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BuSI-
NESS ABROAD 60 (1958).
3 RESTATEMENT § 27, comment d.
The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 9. The Permanent Court of International
Justice discussed the practise of states in exercising jurisdiction over offenses committed
outside their territory "if one of the constituent elements of the offence, and more especially
its effects have taken place there." Id. at 23.
31 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) [hereinafter cited as Alcoa].
,0 Id. at 444.
1' Id. at 443. This principle is also seen in Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911).
Mr. Justice Holmes wrote: "[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and
producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as
if [the actor] had been present at the effect, if the State should succeed in getting him within
its power."
g RESTATEMENT § 18.
See United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); United States v. Sisal
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further been extended to apply to activities by foreign firms alone, where
it was intended to and did result in a substantial effect on United States
commerce."
IV. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES LAWS
The United States has used these broad bases of jurisdiction to apply
its laws extraterritorially in numerous areas but most predominantly in
export controls,45 antitrust regulation,"6 securities and exchange regula-
tions, 7 and regulation of foreign shipping by the Federal Maritime Com-
mission." This far reaching use of extraterritorial jurisdiction has drawn
severe criticism overseas.' A brief examination of the export controls and
antitrust regulations areas, where extraterritoriality has been a problem,
will point out the difficulties encountered with this expansive extension of
United States legislation.
A. Export Controls
During the 1950's and 1960's the focal point for the debate over extrater-
ritoriality was the United States' active use of trade controls.0 The contro-
versy revolved around the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA),
as amended in 1971,1' and the Export Control Act of 1949,2 which was
Sales Corp. and United States v. Pacific and Atlantic Railway and Navigation Co., 228 U.S.
87 (1912).
11 See United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949); United States
v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795 (1948).
Summerfield, Treasury Regulations affecting Trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc and Cuba,
19 Bus. LAW. 861 (1964).
" See generally K. BREWSTER, note 36 supra; Rahl, Foreign Commerce Jurisdiction of the
American Antitrusts Laws, 43 ANTrrRUST L. J. 521 (1974); Note, Extraterritorial Application
of the Anti-Trust Laws, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1452 (1956); Haight, International Law and the
Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L. J. 639 (1954); Whitney, Sources
of Conflict between International Law and the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L. J. 655 (1954). ,
1, Note, The Extraterritorial Application of the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Acts,
11 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 137 (1978); Sandberg, The Extraterritorial Reach of American Eco-
nomic Regulaton: The Case of Securities Law, 17 HARv. INT'L L. J. 315 (1976); Comment,
The Transnational Reach of Rule 1Ob-5, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1363 (1973); Stevenson, The SEC
and International Law, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 278 (1969).
11 Mann, Anglo-American Conflict of International Jurisdiction, 13 INT'L & COMP. L. Q.
1460 (1964); May, The Status of Federal Maritime Commission Shipping Regulations Under
Principles of International Law, 54 GEo. L. J. 794 (1966).
11 Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, I RECEUIL DS COURS (Aca-
demie de Droit International) 1 (1964); Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United
States Antitrust Laws, 33 BRrr. Y. B. INT'L L. 146 (1957). See also Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v.
T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 871 (1956) (dealing with
United States trademark law); Lauritzen v. Larson, 345 U.S. 571 (1953)(involving the Jones
Act).
See generally, Berman & Garson, United States Export Controls-Past, Present, and
Future, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 791 (1967).
' 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1970).
S2 63 Stat. 7, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2021-32 (1950-1969). See Silverstone, The Export Control
Act of 1949: Extraterritorial Enforcement, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 331 (1959).
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replaced by the Export Administration Act of 1969. 51 The TWEA imposes
a strict embargo on imports from and exports to certain countries.14 During
a national emergency, this Act authorizes the President to prohibit (except
under license) any economic activity such as exports, imports, invest-
ments, and travel with the target country. 55 The Foreign Assets Control
Regulations issued pursuant to the Act are intended to have broad extra-
territorial application to all persons subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States and to all transfers outside the United States of any property
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.5 6
The Export Control and Administration Acts require licensing for all
commercial exports of goods and technology of United States origin to
prevent a drain on scarce resources and to "exercise vigilance over exports
from the standpoint of their significance to national security. 5 7 Licenses
are granted on the basis of the character of the product and its destination.
Products that are considered "strategic" require a special license giving
express authority to export the particular product to a designated coun-
try.5 The enforcement procedures are somewhat similar to Arab boycott
policing techniques, making use of certificates, questionnaires, and black-
lists. The Department of Treasury sends out questionnaires, concerning
the end-use and expected transshipment of the exported goods. If the firm
does not reply it may be blacklisted, and as a result, be denied the right
to deal with any transactions involving United States goods. In addition,
persons dealing with blacklisted firms are subject to being blacklisted
themselves. 59
United States trade controls have given rise to numerous conflicts with
the laws and policies of the host countries of United States subsidiaries.
For instance, in 1974 Argentina threatened to nationalize a United States
subsidiary when its export license was blocked by the Treasury Depart-
ment, halting a sale of autos to Cuba. After stringent diplomatic protests,
the United States compromised by granting a special license in the inter-
ests of "good relations with Argentina."60 Trade controls have continually
caused friction with Canada because of the pervasive presence of United
States-controlled industry in that country.6 In 1958, the Foreign Assets
50 U.S.C. app. § 2401-13 (1970)(amended 1977).
6' Formally including China, but now consisting of North Korea, North and South Viet-
nam, Cambodia, and Cuba.
A. LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS, 7 (1977).
31 C.F.R. § 500. 201 (1971).
6 A. LOWENFELD, supra note 55, at 14.
Id. at 15.
5 Lowenfeld, "... Sauce for the Gander": The Arab Boycott and United States Political
Trade Controls, 12 TEx. INT'L L. J. 25, 31 (1977). See also Cacermet S.A. and Andre Letiers,
36 Fed. Reg. 13,048 (1971).
" N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1974, at 1, col. 6.
See Corcoran, The Trading With the Enemy Act and the Controlled Canadian
[Vol. 8:741748
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Control Regulations frustrated Canada's plan to sell 1,000 vehicles to
China, causing great resentment over the domineering policies of its neigh-
bor."2 When the United States halted the sale of 30 locomotives to Cuba
in 1974, Prime Minister Trudeau personally intervened to get permission
to carry out the transaction.1
3
The cause c~lbre of extraterritorial use of trade controls involved the
Fruehauf corporation." Fruehauf was organized in Detroit in 1918, and by
1965 had factories in 10 countries. Its subsidiary, S.A. Fruehauf-France
was owned 70% by the parent company and 30% by French investors. The
parent appointed five of the eight directors, with the others appointed by
the French investors. In 1964 Fruehauf-France contracted to sell its semi-
trailers to Berliet, a French truck manufacturer. The tractor-trailers were
to be resold to China. On learning of the transaction, the Department of
Treasury warned Fruehauf-Detroit that the sale violated the Foreign As-
sets Control Regulations, and they would be assessed heavy criminal pen-
alties."
The home corporation ordered Fruehauf-France to cancel the contract
but Berliet refused to release the company and threatened a million dollar
damage suit for breach of contract. The three French directors sued the
American directors in the Commercial Court of Corbeil seeking the ap-
pointment of an administrator to manage the company temporarily and
execute the contested contract. The relief was granted, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed66 observing that the consequences of the breach of con-
tract would imperil the existence of the corporation and the jobs of its 600
employees. 7 While the contract was carried out under the administrator,
the Secretary of the Treasury ruled that Fruehauf-France was no longer
Corporation, 14 McGILL L. J. 174 (1968); A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE INVESTMENT,
ch. I, § 1.2 (1976); Stevenson, Extraterritoriality in Canadian-U.S. Relations, 63 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 425 (1970).
" Prime Minister Diefenbaker and President Eisenhower met and agreed to full consulta-
tion between the governments "where the export policies of the two countries may not be in
complete harmony." 39 DEP'T STATE BULL. 209 (1958). Baum, The Global Corporation: An
American Challenge to the Nation-State? 55 IowA L. REv. 410, 417-30 (1969).
6" Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 1974, at 18, col. 3; Mar. 11, 1974, at 6, col. 4; Mar. 19, 1974, at 14,
col. 2.
" A good discussion of the case is found in A. LOWENFELD, supra note 55, at 81.
Id. at 82.
" Judgment of May 22, 1965, Cour d'appeal, Paris, [19681 Dalloz-Sirey, Jurisprudence
[D.S. Jur. 147, excerpted in English in H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
PROBLEMS 1225 (2d ed. 1976).
" The court's decision was based on the French concept of abus de droit (abuse of a legal
right) where the court could overrule a corporate management decision if the court felt its
action was contrary to the company's interest. Craig, Application of the Trading with the
Enemy Act to Foreign Corporations Owned by Americans: Reflections on Fruehauf v.
Massardy, 83 HARV. L. REV. 579, 581 (1970). For the French government's arguments, see A.
LOWENFELD, supra note 55, at 88.
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controlled by Fruehauf-Detroit and so was no longer subject to its jurisdic-
tion. The issue of the license was thereby avoided and an informal under-
standing appears to have been reached that Fruehauf-France would not
participate in transactions with China in the future. 8
The problem over extraterritorial application of trade controls has less-
ened in importance in the 1970's. In 1975, the Organization of American
States lifted the collective embargo on trade with Cuba. The United States
relaxed its trade policy regarding its subsidiaries and Cuba, granting gen-
eral "licenses . . .when [the United States subsidiaries] are operating in
countries where local law or policy favors trade with Cuba.""9 With the
opening of trade to China, detente with the Soviet Union and tentative
steps towards normalization of relations with Cuba, United States policy
has shifted towards promotion of East-West trade and relaxation of trade
controls over non-strategic goods. 0
B. Antitrust Regulation
In recent times the most prominent point of contention over extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction has been in the field of antitrust regulation.7 Initially, it
was the United States policy to limit the application of the Sherman Act.
This early view is expressed in Justice Holmes' opinion in American Ba-
nana Co. v. United Fruit Co.72 The plaintiff alleged that the United Fruit
Company, as part of its monopolistic scheme, instigated the Costa Rican
government's seizure of American Banana plantations and railways.
Holmes wrote:
[Tlhe acts causing this damage were done so far as appears outside the
jurisdiction of the United States and within that of other States. It is
surprising to hear it argued that they were governed by the Act of Congress
...[The] general and almost universal rule is that the character of an
act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the
country where the act is done.73
Such a strict territorial view has become outmoded with the rise of
multinational corporations and worldwide marketing, and would have ren-
dered ineffective comprehensive American regulatory schemes. The scope
' Id. at 91.
" 73 DEP'T STATE BULL. 404 (1975).
Skol & Peterson, Export Control Laws and Multinational Enterprises, 11 INT'L LAW. 29,
43 (1977).
' Jones, Extraterritoriality in US. Antitrust: An International "Hot Potato," 11 INT'L
LAW. 415 (1977); INTERNATIONAL LAW ASS'N, REP. OF THE FIFTY-FIRST CONFERENCE, 304-592
(1964) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL LAW Ass'N REPORT]; Jennings, Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws, 33 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 146, 161-75 (1957);
Fugate, Antitrust Jurisdiction and Foreign Sovereignty, 49 VA. L. REv. 925 (1963).




of the Sherman Act was construed more broadly in the Alcoa case. What
Justice Holmes considered "surprising" in 1909 was to Judge Hand
"settled law" when he asserted that the agreements involved "were unlaw-
ful even though they were made abroad, if they were intended to affect
imports and did affect them."7 The Court further held that "[a] state
may impose liabilities; even upon persons not within its allegiance, for
conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which
the state reprehends."'75
The broad reach of this doctrine was seen in United States v. Watch-
makers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc."5 An action was brought
against numerous Swiss and American organizations for violations of the
Sherman Antitrust Act and of the Wilson Tariff Act. The suit involved an
agreement known as the Collective Convention which regulated the pro-
duction, sale, and exports of watches and component and repair parts. The
courts held jurisdiction over the American subsidiaries by virtue of the
control exercised by the parent corporations.7 The defendants argued that
the Collective Convention was sanctioned by the Swiss government and
was part of its governmental policy of protecting the Swiss watch indus-
try. 78
The court ignored the objections made by the Swiss Confederation in its
amicus curiae brief charging that the United States actions impugned
Swiss sovereignity in violation of international law, or that they consti-
tuted a direct attack upon the legislation and policy of the Swiss Confeder-
ation.79 Rejecting their arguments, the court stated:
If, of course the defendant's activity had been required by Swiss law this
court could do nothing . . . . [Tihe defendant's activities were not re-
quired . . . . It is clear that these private agreements were then recog-
nized as facts of economic and industrial life by that nation's government
... . In the absence of a direct foreign governmental action compelling
the defendant's activity, a United States court may exercise its jurisdic-
tion as to acts and contracts abroad, if. . . such acts. . . have a substan-
tial and material effect upon foreign and domestic commerce."0
7' Alcoa, supra note 39, at 444.
71 Id. at 443.
11 133 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), reargument denied, 134 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)(the first opinion deals with the question of jurisdiction). On December 20, 1962, an opinion
was handed down in favor of the United States. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland
Information Center Inc., 1963 TRADE CASES (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
11 133 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The court further stated: "Jurisdiction over the parent
is not being sought through subsidiary, but jurisdiction of the subsidiary is being sought
through the parent." Id. at 48.
1, For an excellent discussion of the Swiss Watch case see Note, Limitations on the Federal
Judicial Power to Compel Acts Violating Foreign Law, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1441, 1448 (1963).
7, Swiss Confederation amicus curiae brief, as quoted in INTERNATIONAL LAw Ass'N REPORT
supra note 71, at 377.
1 1963 TRADE CASES (CCH) 70,600 at 77456-57 (emphasis added). A similar result was
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In another celebrated case, United States v. Imperial Chemical
Industries,"' United States District Court Judge Ryan held that the agree-
ments between a British corporation, Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI),
and an American corporation, E.I. duPont de Nemours & Company, Inc.
(duPont) divided up world markets in violation of the Sherman Act. Du-
Pont invented nylon in the 1930's and sold its British patents for it to ICI
which in turn sublicensed them to British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. (BNS). s2
The court held the exclusive licensing arrangement between duPont and
ICI to be illegal and unreasonably restrictive of trade. To reestablish com-
petitive conditions in the United States export and import markets, the
court ordered duPont to transfer part of its American patent rights to ICI
and ordered ICI to grant duPont immunity from suit for infringement of
its patent rights in Great Britain."
BNS, bringing suit in Great Britain obtained an injunction restraining
ICI from complying with the United States decree and an order for specific
performance of their contractual rights to the patents.s" The English court
held that since it was an English contract between English nationals to be
performed in England, it seemed that BNS had, at least, established a
prima facie case that the United States courts were not competent to
interfere with British patent rights. 5 In granting specific performance for
BNS, Evershed, M.R., said of the United States court order:
If... the judge intended to say (as it seems to me he did) that it was not
an intrusion on the authority of a foreign sovereign to make directions
addressed to that foreign sovereign or to its courts or to nationals of that
foreign Power effective to remove (as he said) harmful effects on the trade
reached in United States v. Holophane Co., 119 F. Supp. 114 (S.D. Ohio 1954), aff'd per
curiam, by an equally divided court, 352 U.S. 903 (1956). The court held that an agreement
dividing up the world market for patented and trademarked prismatic glassware and lighting
fixtures violated the Sherman Act. The court's decree ordered the American corporation "to
use reasonable efforts ... to promote the sale and distribution" of its product overseas. The
judgment was construed as requiring only those acts which did not affirmatively violate a
foreign law or valid judgment of a competent foreign court. 1954 TRADE CASES (CCH) 67,679
(S.D. Ohio 1954). See also United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y.
1945), a/i'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947); United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp.
284 (N.D. Ohio 1949), aff'd and modified, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
11 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (judgment for defendant); United States v. Imperial
Chemical Industries, Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (supplemented opinion on
remedies).
K' Jones, supra note 71, at 429.
' 105 F. Supp. 215, 226-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). One critic noted that "jurisdiction is taken to
the extreme length of issuing directives to a foreign corporation concerning the disposition
by it of property owned by it in its own country under its own law." Jennings, supra note 71,
at 167.
1 British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., [19531 Ch. 19
(1952), [19521 2 All E.R. 780 (C.A.).
" Id. at 26, [19521 2 All E.R. at 783.
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of the United States, I am bound to say. . .I find myself unable to agree
with it."
The export control and antitrust cases illustrate the potential for conflict
when the United States extends its regulatory scheme beyond its borders.
The subsidiary may find itself caught between the undesirable alternatives
of obeying the domestic country's laws and facing sanctions within the host
country, or adhering to the host country's laws in violation of the domestic
regulation. The businessman trading in the Middle East market encoun-
ters a similar problem. If he does not follow the boycott regulations he may
be blacklisted and denied access to Arab business. Yet, if he complies with
certain prohibited boycott requests, he may face severe criminal or civil
penalties. 7
V. EAA IN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law is recognized as part of our national law" and "must
be ascertained and administered by the courts . as often as questions of
right depending upon it are duly presented . . ."" United States courts
will always try to construe a statute within the framework of international
law.9" Chief Justice Marshall in The Charming Betsy declared:
An act of congress (sic) ought never to be construed to violate the laws of
nations if any other possible construction remains, and consequently, can
never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce,
further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this
country.'
However, international law provides no bright line limitation on the
extent of the effective reach of national legislation. When interpreting
federal law, the courts look to the congressional intent in passing the legis-
lation, 2 since Congress does not lack the power to prescribe a law that
Id. at 25, [19521 2 All E.R. at 782. Denning, L.J., stated further, "It would be a serious
matter if there were a conflict between the orders of the courts of the United States and the
orders of these courts. The writ of the United States does not run in this country and, if due
regard is had to the comity of nations, it will not seek to run here." Id. at 28, [19521 2 All
E.R. at 784.
, Note, Analysis and Application of the Anti-Boycott Provisions of the Export Adminis-
tration Amendments of 1977, 9 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 915, 916 (1977).
11 International law is constitutionally recognized in art. I § 8 which provides that
"Congress shall have Power .. .to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on
the high Seas and Offences against the Law of Nations ... " (emphasis added).
" The Pacquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1889).
" See, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1962); Laur-
itzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 576-79 (1952).
" Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64,115-18 (1804); accord
Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
" "[Tihe only question open is whether Congress intended to impose the liability, and
whether our own Constitution permitted it to do so .... " Alcoa, supra note 39, at 443.
1978]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
might be beyond the permissible limits of international law.13 As long as
the statute does not exceed the power authorized by the Constitution the
courts will uphold it. 4 In Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo S.A., for
example, the Court was willing to apply the United States statute, even if
it would be in derogation of international law. In that case, however, the
Court expressed the belief that "[in the] delicate field of international
relations there must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress
clearly expressed. It alone has the facilities necessary to make fairly such
an important policy decision.""
The intent of Congress in the EAA to disallow compliance with certain
boycott requirements is clearly expressed in the statute as well as in its
legislative history. The Export Administration Regulations (EAR) are in-
tended to have broad application to all United States persons including the
overseas subsidiary chartered under the laws of the foreign country if it is
"controlled in fact" by an American company or individuals. Even though
the EAR allow limited compliance with the host country's laws by a bona
fide resident of the boycotting country, the restrictions prohibiting compli-
ance in transactions involving import of non-specifically identifiable
goods, services, and goods for retail operations might be considered an
infringement on the sovereignty of the host country. Clearly, the host
country has the right to prescribe laws regarding conduct within its bor-
ders, and it has an immediate interest in the economic regulation of its
businesses."9
However, the application of the EAA to American-controlled subsidiar-
ies is consonant with its traditionally recognized bases of jurisdiction. In
many instances, jurisdiction may be upheld under the conduct theory. In
fulfilling boycott requirements certain activities may occur within the ter-
ritory of the United States, giving it jurisdiction over the defendant even
if only part of the proscribed activity is done in this country. Activities
such as the transfer of letters of credit containing boycott-based stipula-
tions by banks, the processing of certificates of origin by exporters or Arab
Chambers of Commerce, and the preparation of boycott questionnaires by
American companies are commonly carried out in the United States when
complying with the boycott. Counsel for Morgan Guaranty Trust Company
testified in congressional hearings that between December 1975 and April
1976, his bank recieved 824 letters of credit in transactions with boycott-
" "[11f Congress has expressly prescribed a rule with respect to conduct outside the
United States, even one going beyond the scope as recognized by foreign relations law, a
United States court would be bound to follow the congressional direction unless this would
violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." Leasco Data Processing Equipment
Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972).
" Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957).
" RESTATEMENT § 17.
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related clauses involving $41,237,815. In each case, the company complied
with the boycott certifications as a condition of payments under the letters
of credit."
The EAA applies only to corporations which are "controlled in fact" by
Americans. Although the EAR establish broad presumptions of control of
the subsidiary by its parent corporation," these presumptions can be re-
butted by competent evidence showing that control, in fact, does not
exist." Such a controlled corporation may be regarded as a national of the
United States and thereby remain under its continuing personal jurisdic-
tion.' ® In Skiriotes v. Florida, Chief Justice Hughes wrote:
..the United States is not debarred by any rule of international law
from governing the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas, or even
in foreign countries when the rights of other nations or their nationals are
not infringed . . .. [Tihere is no question of international law, but solely
of the purport of the municipal law which establishes the duty of the
citizen in relation to his own government.' 0'
In any event, the same factors used in determining the subsidiary's nation-
ality would be significant in asserting jurisdiction on the grounds of control
of the subsidiary by the parent company.102 Likewise penalties can be
imposed on the parent for its subsidiary's unlawful activities.'03
The EAA clearly meets the qualifications set out in Restatement section
18 under the "effects" principle of jurisdiction. The conduct prohibited,
that is, compliance with certain boycott requirements and their resulting
discriminatory effect, are constituent and necessary elements of the activ-
ity proscribed by the regulations. Moreover, the impact of the Arab boycott
is a "direct and foreseeable" consequence of the concerted effort of the
Arab League to use its economic power in its war against Israel. The
"effects" of the boycott is substantial due to the volume of trade between
the United States and the Arab countries. The Moss Report on the Arab
Boycott and American Business stated that between 1974 and 1975 "at
least $4.5 billion worth of U.S. sales and proposed sales to Arab countries
11 H.R. REP. No. 190, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 53, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1169.
," There is a rebuttable presumption of control where the parent owns or controls 50% of
its voting stocks or if it controls directly or indirectly 25% or more of the voting securities
where no other person has an equal or higher percentage. EAR § 369.1 (c)(2)(i),(ii), 43 Fed.
Reg. 3513 (1978). There are further presumptions where the parent has the authority to
appoint either a majority of the board of directors, giving it the ability to control the general
policies of the subsidiary, or the power to appoint the chief officer of the subsidiary, giving it
effective control of its daily operations. EAR § 369.1 (c)(2)(iii)(vi), 43 Fed. Reg. 3513 (1978).
EAR Preamble, 43 Fed. Reg. 3508 (1978).
'® Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
"' 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1971).
112 See text accompanying note 77 supra.
"03 RESTATEMENT § 27, comment d.
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. . . were subject to boycott requests. °0 The Report estimated that United
States firms were complying with over 90% of the boycott conditions. 5
VI. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATIONS OF THE EAA
While the United States bases its exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction
in the EAA on recognized principles of international law, it must be re-
membered that the Arab states have equally valid claims for control over
the subsidiary within their countries, deriving their claims from the same
principles of jurisdiction. The problem arises that both the domestic and
host countries have supportable grounds for jurisdiction over the subsidi-
ary, while their national laws and policies are in opposition, thus subject-
ing the subsidiary to conflicting pressures. Since the United States and the
Arab League have concurrent jurisdiction, the question becomes not one
of the lack of prescriptive jurisdiction, but of the desirability of its enforce-
ment.
In situations where the United States shares concurrent prescriptive
jurisdiction with another country, the Restatement section 40 asserts that
international law calls for each state to examine its claims in good faith
and to temper its exercise of jurisdiction with the recognition of the pri-
macy of the interests involved. Consideration is to be given to
the vital national interests of each of the states; the extent and nature of
hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the
person; the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the
territory of the other state; and the extent to which enforcement by action
of either state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the
rule prescribed by that state.'"
In determining the justifications for the extraterritorial application of
the EAA it is important to note the unusual nature of the problem with
which the statute attempts to deal. The EAA was passed in response to a
pervasive and organized interference in the United States market.' 7 The
United States has a legitimate interest in "the integrity of its domestic
,01 THE ARAB BOYCOTT AND AMERICAN BUSINESS, REPORT BY THE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. vii (1976) [hereinafter cited as the Moss REPORT].
"' The three most common boycott requests were that the seller submit certificates of
origin for the goods, that the ship transferring the goods not be blacklisted, and that the
carrier not stop at Israeli ports. Only 15 of the reported boycott requests with the Commerce
Department between 1974 and 1975 contained clauses of a religious or ethnic nature. Exam-
ples of these requests were clauses requesting certification that there were no persons em-
ployed in senior management positions who were of Jewish faith, were Zionists, had pur-
chased Israeli bonds, contributed to the United Jewish Appeal, or were members of organiza-
tions supporting Israel. Id. at ix.
RESTATEMENT § 40.
,'i See Schwartz, The Arab Boycott and American Responses: Antitrust Law or Executive
Discretion, 54 TEX. L. REv. 1260, 1265-67 (1976); Turck, supra note 4.
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order and the regulation of its export trade." ' The boycott itself is an
extraterritorial extension of Arab foreign policy on American business
which seeks to affect the trade relationship between the United States and
one of its allies. To the extent the boycott intervenes in United States
economic affairs, it results in an impairment of United States sover-
eignty."9 The two major factors which combine to give leverage to the Arab
boycott within the United States are the increasing commerce between the
two nations and American dependence on Arab oil. The first resulted from
the the quintupling of the oil prices which created an enormous flow of
wealth to the Arab countries."0 With their increased buying power, vast
new markets for United States goods and services were opened. Since 1973,
the Middle East market for United States exports has doubled from ap-
proximately 5% to nearly 10% of the total United States exports. The
volume of sales to Arab states has grown significantly from $1 billion in
1971 to a present level of $7 billion per year."' In addition the Arabs are
putting nearly $10 billion annually into investments in the United
States." 2 The second major factor is United States dependence on Arab oil.
The United States imports more than one-third of all its oil from Arab
League states, representing more than 15% of the total oil consumption in
the United States." 3
This powerful economic force has brought great pressure to bear on
American companies to adhere to boycott policies in order to get Arab
business. This coercion of the exporting industry tends to divert the free
movement of trade based on market conditions to one based on the foreign
policy objectives of the Arab League. While the Arab states have the sover-
eign right to refuse to deal with any country they choose, they have no
concomitant right to dictate the business policies of American companies.
The boycott provisions were drawn with regard to the recognition of the
host country's right to regulate its businesses. The application of EAA to
the American-controlled company is narrowed to only those transactions
which take place in United States commerce. It does not purport to cover
"I Steiner, International Boycotts and Domestic Order: American Involvement in the
Arab-Israeli Conflict, 54 TEx. L. REv. 1355, 1402 (1976).
'" Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 429 (statement of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance).
11 Turck, supra note 4, at 485.
Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 429. In terms of jobs, each billion dollars of trade
roughly translates into 50,000 jobs so that nearly half a million jobs depend on the export
trade to Arab countries. Id. at 462 (statement of Secretary of Commerce Juanita Krebs).
"I Id. at 429. As a result of this heavy investment, concern has been raised over the use of
these investments and deposits as a lever to achieve Arab political goals. See Hearings on S.
425, Amendment No. 24 Thereto; S. 953, S. 995, and S. 1303 Before the Subcomm. on
International Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975); see generally Niehuss, Foreign Investment in the United States: A
Review of Government Policy, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 65 (1975).
"I Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 429.
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transactions of United States firms "which involve the commerce of a
foreign country and not U.S. exports.""' The statute permits the subsidi-
ary resident in the boycotting country to follow the host country's laws
with respect to its activities exclusively within the host country, and in
importation of specifically identifiable goods for its own use and in the
performance of its contractual duties. The EAR forbid compliance with
local law regarding discrimination against United States citizens and im-
ports of nonspecifically identifiable goods, services, and goods for retail
operations. 115
Although an American subsidiary is generally required to conduct itself
within the ambit of United States laws, the antiboycott rules are flexible
in allowing a resident to conform to the host country's laws, except where
compliance would result in evasion of the statute or where fulfillment of
the boycott requirement would violate United States public policy. To
employ an extreme example, suppose company X determines that it might
be very lucrative to engage in slave trade in country Y. Although slavery
may be officially sanctioned and recognized by the laws of that country,
such activity by a United States company would not be allowed."' Like-
wise, the United States requires its companies within the boycotting coun-
tries to abstain from certain boycott activities which are deemed incom-
patible with American government policy.
The EAA does not deviate from the United States policy of not compel-
ling a breach of law in another sovereign state."7 Even though the United
States maintains that it is not precluded from exercising its jurisdiction
because it might subject the subsidiary to liability under another state's
laws, 8 the United States will generally not enforce an order which in effect
necessitates a breach of law in another country. The trade control and
antitrust cases discussed earlier illustrate this point. In the Fruehauf case,
the Treasury Department used the fact that "control" by the temporary
administration removed it from United States jurisdiction to avoid the
clash of conflicting requirements on the subsidiary. In the Canadian and
Argentinian affairs, agreements were worked out through diplomatic chan-
"' Id. at 2 (statement of Senator Stevenson).
" See text accompanying notes 17-29 supra.
See Comment, supra note 5, at 1001.
An analogous situation occurred in the Swiss Watch Case. The subsidiary was held in
violation of United States antitrust regulations, even though the activity was sanctioned by
the Swiss government. See discussion accompanying note 76 supra.
"' Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Acting Deputy Legal Advisor to the State Department wrote:
"the United States has been the most ambitious of the major democratic states in trying to
regulate international commerce; it has at least a claim to jurisdiction over vast commercial
enterprises abroad owned and controlled by American parent companies ... [als to conflict
with the domestic law of other countries, both courts and federal agencies in the United States
have been careful not to put persons, particularly aliens, in the position of having to violate
one law or the other." Lowenfeld, Book Review, 78 HAav. L. REv. 1699, 1705 (1965).
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nels to avert the confrontation."'
The antitrust cases generally follow this trend. The court's decree in the
ICI case included a "savings clause" which allowed the English courts to
get around inconsistent court decrees.120 The court in the Swiss Watch case
drew the distinction that the defendants' activity was permitted, but not
required, by the laws of the Swiss Confederation. The defendants, there-
fore, could obey the court order without violating Swiss law.
The EAA prohibits compliance with boycott requests, but does not re-
quire affirmative action in contravention of the host country's laws. The
United States subsidiary, resident in the boycotting country, is not forced
to violate the host country's laws and can operate within the framework
of the statute without subjecting itself to liability in either the domestic
or host state. It does not have to engage in the areas of prohibited conduct.
Since the statute only applies to transactions in United States commerce,
the firm can avoid the EAA's scope and comply with the boycott restric-
tions when importing goods and services from non-United States sources.
Perhaps the strongest justification for the broad application of the anti-
boycott rules is the precarious risk of religious discrimination that per-
vades the boycott. The Arab League has repeatedly stated that the boycott
involves no religious discrimination.'2 ' Mohammed Mahmoud Mahgoub,
Commissioner General of the Central Office for the Boycott of Israel wrote:
[t]he Boycott Principles are also very far from racial religious influences;
[they are] practiced with all persons . . . notwithstanding their national-
ity or religion as long as they support the economy of Israel, and its war
effort. [The Boycott does] not discriminate among persons on the basis
of religion or nationality, they rather to do on the basis of their partiality
or impartiality to Israel and Zionism.'12
Former Secretary of Commerce Elliott L. Richardson has said "...[t]he
evidence thus far supports the view that the boycott is symptomatic of the
Mideast conflict and that, in its current manifestations, it is not based on
religious or ethnic criteria.""'2 Yet despite these denials that the boycott
11 RESTATEMENT § 39.
120 See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra.
'7 See Mann, note 49 supra, at 152. The practice has developed of including "savings
clauses" in court decrees where there may be conflict with host's laws. In United States v.
General Electric Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 878 (D.N.J. 1953), the court said ". . .Phillips shall
not be in contempt of this Judgment for doing anything outside of the United States which
is required or for not doing anything outside of the United States which is unlawful under
the laws of the government,,in which Phillips or any other subsidiaries may be incorporated
. . . ;" accord, United States v. Gulf Oil Corp. [19631 TRADE CASES (CCH) 77344, 77349
(S.D.N.Y.); United States v. American Type Founders Co., [1958] TRADE CASES (CCH)
74203, 74206-07 (D.N.J.).
12 Turck, supra note 4, at 480.
Excerpt from "Nature of the Boycott of Israel" enclosed with an August 31, 1975, letter
from Commissioner General Mahgoub to the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
19781
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
is not directed at Jews but rather at Zionists and supporters of Israel,
these murky distinctions between Zionist and Jew have in practice seemed
more rhetorical than real. Numerous incidents have been reported where
the boycott policy has been translated into blatant discrimination against
Jewish Americans. 124
Even though the boycott may not be overtly discriminatory, its under-
tones raise the threat of injecting antisemitism into American business
practices. 2 There exists a great potential for a "shadow boycott.' ' 2 Mis-
guided businessmen may unilaterally avoid trading with Israeli firms or
employing Jews in the hopes of currying favor with potential Arab clients.
The problem is compounded by the unique nature of the boycott target.
"Israel is not only a sovereign state, but one established for the purpose of
providing a homeland for Jews. . . . [It is] the symbol of a worldwide
religious ethnic community.' 2 7
The provision allowing conformance with a host country's laws explicitly
excludes the exception for religious discrimination against United States
persons, and forbids the subsidiary from giving discriminatory information
about a United States person's race, religion, sex, or national origin. 2s
American companies should not be allowed to discriminate against other
Americans. The United States Constitution,2 9 Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act,' 30 and various executive orders 2 ' have condemned discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin." 2 The United
States adheres to a policy of non-discrimination as an absolute, fundamen-
tal principle that will not be compromised by its companies at home or
abroad.
(New York). The letter was included in the Moss Report. Moss REPORT, supra note 104, at
85.
"I Extension of the Export Administration Act of 1969: Hearings Before the House Comm.
on Int'l Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 268, June 8-11, 15, and 16 and August 10 and 24, 1976.
Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon agreed, stating, "[a]ccording to its governing
principles, the Arab boycott of Israel is not based on discrimination against U.S. firms or
citizens or ethnic or religious grounds." Id. at 48. Accord, statement of Assistant Secretary
of State Joseph Greenwald. Id. at 11-12. Cf. W. NELSON & T. PRITE, THE ECONOMIC WAR
AGAINST JEWS 77-85 (1977).
121 N. JOYNER, ARAB BOYCOTT ANTI-BOYCOTT: THE EFFECT ON U.S. BUSINESS 34 (1977);
Schwartz, supra note 107, at 1267; Steiner, supra note 108, at 1366.
"I Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1975, at 8, col. 1.
"2 N. JOYNER, supra note 125, at 1.
'2 Moss REPORT, supra note 104, at 1.
121 EAR § 369.3(f-2)(10), 43 Fed. Reg. 3533 (1978).
", U.S. CONST. amend. I.
13 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e 17 (1976).
1: 2 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1966-1970 Compilation), 42 U.S.C. §





The extraterritorial scope of the EAA is justified despite the potential
conflict with host country regulations, due to the peculiar nature of the
boycott, its unique risk of discrimination, and the possibility of evasion of
the legislation through the foreign subsidiary. 3 3 The antiboycott regula-
tions were drawn carefully to avoid confrontation, balancing the right of
the Arab states to govern the businesses in their territory with the interest
of the United States in having its subsidiaries act in accordance with its
laws. The extension of the boycott rules to the subsidiary is supported by
recognized principles of jurisdiction in conformity with international law,
and within the framework of prior United States practices. The American
corporation is able to do business in the Arab countries obeying the boycott
laws and still remain within the parameters of the EAA. The firm may
either refrain from engaging in the prohibited conduct or remove itself from
the coverage of the legislation by operating outside of United States inter-
state or foreign commerce.
The only real solution to the boycott problem lies in the cessation of
Middle East hostilities and suspension of the economic warfare. Until
these differences are settled, the antiboycott regulations of the EAA are
necessary in order to preserve the integrity of United States commerce and
to prevent the Arab-Israeli conflict from invading and manipulating the
American marketplace.
Robert S. Wayne
'3 The EAA applies only to actions within United States commerce. Discriminatory hiring
practices in the employment of non-United States persons by the subsidiary either within the
boycotting country or in Europe, while possibly violating United States civil rights laws,
would be a violation of the antiboycott regulations. See Comment, The Arab Boycott and
Title VII, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 181 (1977).
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